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Abstract
This article addresses concerns that the growth in global governancemay be bringing with it a decline in the significance of
democratic sources of political legitimacy. One approach in evaluating such concerns is to ask whether the respective pat-
terns of legitimation for private and public authority differ or whether they refer to a similar set of normative standards.
Private transnational governance regimes provide useful contexts in which to assess the presumed democratic erosion.
They seem, almost of themselves, to make the case for such a decline: in them regulatory authority is exercised by non-
state actors who, by their very nature, lack the kind of authorization afforded by the democratic procedures that legitimize
state-based regulation; in addition, they are intrinsically linked to the notion of politics as a form of problem-solving rather
than as the exercise of power. Given these characteristics, when governance arrangements of this kind are subjected to
criticism, one would expect justificatory responses to relate primarily to performance, with normative criteria such as
fundamental individual rights and the imperative for democratic procedure playing only a minor role. On the basis of a
qualitative content analysis, the study tests three ideal-type patterns of legitimation for plausibility. The case selected
for examination is the recent controversy surrounding the hybrid governance regime that operates to prevent the use of
performance-enhancing drugs in sport. The debate offers the possibility of a ‘nutshell’ comparison of the respective pat-
terns of legitimation used in criticizing and justifying state and non-state regulatory authority. This comparison yields two
findings. The first is that the values used to appraise the state-based components of the sporting world’s hybrid regulatory
regime do not differ systematically from those used to appraise the private elements: contestation and justification in both
cases are founded on normative criteria relating to fundamental individual rights and democratic procedure and not just
on performance-related considerations. The second finding is that justificatory grounds of the first type do not appear to
be diminishing in importance vis-à-vis those of the second.
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1. Introduction
Global governance is characterized by the increasing ex-
ercise of regulatory authority by private actors. These
actors participate directly in the formulation and imple-
mentation of rules governing international affairs (see
Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002;
Wolf, 2008). This omnipresent regulatory plurality is a
challenge for anyone attempting to assess the legitimacy
of authority beyond the state (Wolf, 2006). One of its ef-
fects is to put state actors’ traditional legitimatory reper-
toires under pressure and concerns have begun to be
expressed that the rise in governance beyond the state
may be bringing with it a decline in the significance of
democratic sources of political legitimacy (Papadopou-
los, 2010; Zuern, 2011). The present article explores
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these concerns, specifically by asking whether the emer-
gence of private forms of regulation in the transnational
sphere has been accompanied by a shift in the normative
standards by which the legitimacy of regulatory author-
ity is judged, or whether, instead, the respective ways in
which private and state-based regulation are legitimized
are grounded in similar values.1
Transnational private governance regimes are use-
ful contexts in which to assess the presumed decline
of democratic sources of legitimation in the trans-state
realm. They seem, almost of themselves, to make the
case for such a decline: in them regulatory authority
is exercised by non-state actors who, by their very na-
ture, lack the kind of authorization afforded by the demo-
cratic procedures that legitimize state-based regulation;
in addition, they are intrinsically linked to the notion of
politics as a means of problem-solving rather than as
the (democratically controlled) exercise of power. Given
these characteristics, when governance arrangements of
this kind are subject to criticism, one would expect jus-
tificatory responses to relate primarily to performance,
with normative criteria such as fundamental individual
rights and the imperative for democratic procedure play-
ing only a minor role.
There is a wealth of literature listing the normative
criteria that transnational private self-regulatory regimes
should adhere to and then working out, through case
studies, how far they actually do so.2 By contrast, rel-
atively little is known about which of these normative
criteria assume actuality in real-life controversies about
the legitimacy of the regulatory authority exercised by
private actors. By including participant perspectives on
what is legitimate and why, we will have a more com-
prehensive picture on which to base any assessment of
the decline in significance which democratic legitimation
of regulatory authority has allegedly undergone with the
rise in private regulation.
The present investigation begins by identifying three
ideal-type arguments regarding the legitimatory de-
mands associated with private self-regulation. These are
extracted from the relevant literature and represent
three distinct patterns of legitimation (Section 2). From
this theoretical material, a set of keywords is derived to
serve as a guide for content analysis of actual contro-
versies relating to the legitimacy of regulatory author-
ity. Section 3 outlines the particular case selected to
test the plausibility of the theoretical conjectures and
identifies the data-sources used for the empirical anal-
ysis. The case selected for a comparison of the respec-
tive grounds on which the state-based and private self-
regulatory elements of this regime are legitimized or crit-
icized is that of the hybrid governance regime that oper-
ates to prevent the use of performance-enhancing drugs
in sport. ‘The crisis of confidence in the governance of
sport’, remarked one athletes’ representative recently,
‘has justifiably reached new levels’ (Schwab, 2015). It is
a crisis reflected in widespread debate about the lack
of legitimacy of transnational private self-regulation and
the need for state involvement to make up for this. Fo-
cusing on the example of recent national anti-doping
legislation in Germany—introduced in response to the
presumed shortcomings of existing transnational private
arrangements—Section 4 offers a qualitative content
analysis of a case that is particularly apt to our pur-
pose since it allows the pros and cons of state-based
and non-state regulation to be compared, as it were, ‘in
a nutshell’.
The study yields two key findings. The first is that the
value patterns used to appraise the state-based compo-
nents of the sportingworld’s hybrid regulatory regime do
not differ systematically from those used to appraise the
private elements: in both cases contestation3 and justifi-
cation are founded on normative criteria relating to fun-
damental individual rights and democratic procedure as
well as on performance-related considerations. The sec-
ond finding is that justificatory grounds of the first type
do not appear to be diminishing in importance vis-à-vis
those of the second.
2. Approaches to the Legitimation of Private
Self-Regulation
The ideal-type arguments described here are drawn from
different strands of the literature on the legitimation
of private self-regulation. On the basis of these argu-
ments, categories are identified which are then used to
structure the empirical analysis relating to potential dif-
ferences in patterns of legitimation for public and pri-
vate authority.
2.1. Private Regulatory Authority Neither Needs nor Is
Amenable to Democratic Legitimation
This first approach, although it has a long history as a fun-
damental principle of political liberalism in the Tocquevil-
lean tradition (Gutmann, 1998), tends—undeservedly,
given its heuristic value—to fall victim to dichotomized
debates as to whether output or input requirements
take precedence when it comes to legitimacy.4 It casts
doubt on the notion that private self-regulation requires
any further legitimation at all, given its prior justification
in freedom of association. Associational freedom safe-
guards a person’s right to join a group and to take col-
lective action in pursuance of the interests of that group.
1 Bernstein (2011) poses a similar question.
2 See, among many others, Cashore (2002), Wolf (2002), Keohane and Nye (2003), Pattberg (2005), Boerzel and Risse (2005), Held and Koenig-Archibugi
(2005), Bernstein and Cashore (2007), Dingwerth (2007), Flohr, Rieth, Schwindenhammer and Wolf (2010), Scholte (2011), and Bodansky (2013).
3 Contestation is here taken to mean a questioning of the grounds on which certain regulatory arrangements claim legitimacy. For an excellent overview
of the literature on norm contestation in general, see Wolff and Zimmermann (2016).
4 ‘Output’ and ‘input’ here refer respectively to acceptance created by effective problem-solving that serves the public interest and acceptance created
by democratic procedures (see Scharpf, 1999).
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As a constitutionally enshrined expression of civil liberty,
this fundamental right is founded on each individual’s
capacity for self-determination and self-governance and
has no need to justify itself further. In particular, it has no
need to demonstrate the democratic legitimacy of the in-
ternal structures and decision-making processes through
which it is exercised. On the contrary, as long as it does
not violate the law, it is entitled to look to the state, in its
capacity as a guarantor, to ensure its protection (Schie-
dermair, 2012).
To quote corroborative voices from another quar-
ter: legal scholars assert that private norm-setting that
takes place within the framework of voluntary self-
commitment falls below the threshold of the kind of leg-
islative and executive power exercised by a state (see
Michael, 2005, pp. 434–435). Consequently—and in con-
trast to the position with collectively binding decision-
making that follows from the mandatory exercise of
sovereign authority—private authority is exempted from
any requirement to justify itself, just so long as there con-
tinues to be scope for regulatory influence by the state
or a community of states (Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Wolf,
2014, p. 287). According to this ideal-type argument, any
legitimacy-related dispute about transnational private
self-regulatory regimeswill concern not the performance
or internal democratic structure of the regime but the
justification for any state interference with civil liberty.
2.2. Private Regulatory Authority Must Meet
Output-Related Criteria for Legitimacy
In this second line of reasoning, the premise of a de-
cline in democratic legitimation when regulatory author-
ity is transferred to private actors can be traced back
to a shift of focus in political science towards policy re-
search, newmodes of governance, and new forms of pub-
lic management (Héritier, 2002; Pierre, 2000; Pollitt &
Bouckaert, 2000; see also Krahmann, 2017). The percep-
tion that there is a crisis in the regulatory state in gen-
eral and that ‘traditional public command-and-control’ in
particular has its limitations as a means of governance
(Kooiman, 2000, p. 139) has shifted output-related nor-
mative considerations centre-stage. The thinking here is
that governments, keen to enhance their capacity to pro-
vide common goods, have pinned their hopes on achiev-
ing the ‘modernization’ of state and society by directly in-
volving former addressees of public regulation in the gov-
ernance process (Mayntz, 2002). This move, it is argued,
has not been motivated primarily by a democratic con-
cern to increase participation; rather it is driven by the
idea that problem-solving effectiveness can be enhanced
by utilizing hitherto untapped resources. The growth in
private-governance involvement in both the domestic
and transnational sphere is thus intrinsically linked to a
notion of politics as a form of problem-solving rather than
as the exercise of power (Benz & Papadopoulos, 2006,
p. 7; Ronit & Schneider, 2000). As potential partners in
governance, private regulators need to be invested with
epistemic authority that draws on expertise and problem-
solving capacity as sources of legitimation (see Simmerl
& Zuern, 2016; Zagzebski, 2012). This line of argument
would lead one to expect that controversies about private-
governance involvement—at both domestic and transna-
tional level—will be primarily performance-related and
that democratically rooted requirements in regard to le-
gitimacy will continue to figure only in relation to the po-
litical authority exercised by states.
2.3. Private Regulatory Authority Must Meet
Input-Related Criteria for Legitimacy
The third ideal-type argument asserts that ‘the fun-
damental division between public power and private
freedom’ which forms the basis of the first argument
‘cannot be maintained in the case of private standard-
setters who utilize a putative freedom to exercise power’
(Michael, 2005, p. 44). This view also extends beyond
the second argument, in which self-regulation is seen
not as the exercise of power but as a contribution to
the provision of common goods. This extended perspec-
tive on the ‘democratic deficits’ of transnational private
self-regulation is the subject of a burgeoning body of
literature5 and the requirements to which it gives rise
are reflected in the design of many transnational self-
regulatory arrangements—the Forest Stewardship Coun-
cil often being cited as an example (see, amongmany oth-
ers, Pattberg, 2005, 2006). One of the key observations
of the ‘politicization’ hypothesis (Zuern, 2014; Zuern,
Binder, & Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012) is that international insti-
tutions are increasingly being criticized for not matching
their ‘new, authority-generating quality’ (Zuern, 2012,
p. 409)—backed up by coercive compliance-mechanisms
and often at oddswith state-based regulatory activities—
with appropriate levels of accountability. Although the
politicization hypothesis was originally formulated with
reference to intergovernmental institutions and the
changes occurring in these, it is equally applicable to pri-
vate transnational self-regulatory regimes, which often
assume quasi-state regulatory authority—including leg-
islative, executive, and judicial functions. If the politiciza-
tion mooted by Zuern and others has been matched by
an increasing insistence on input-related standards for
the justification of private contributions to transnational
governance, then the proliferation of transnational pri-
vate regulatory authority need not necessarily result in
a diminution in the significance of democratic sources
of legitimacy.
3. The Lex Sportiva: Case Selection and Data Sources
3.1. Case Selection
The case selected as the basis for probing the plausibility
of these theoretical positions is that of sports law—lex
5 See, among others, Cashore (2002), Bernstein and Cashore (2007), Dingwerth (2007) and Flohr et al. (2010).
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sportiva—more precisely, the transnational regulatory
regime that operates to prevent the use of performance-
enhancing substances in sport. So-called ‘doping’ is one
of the major regulatory problems facing the world of
sports.6 In 1999, in an attempt to tackle this issue, the
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was set up. Its World
Anti-Doping Code (WADC) represents a self-regulatory at-
tempt by sports organizations to co-ordinate anti-doping
measures worldwide. The Code is founded on regulatory
authority exercised by private actors operating in non-
state institutions. The first version of it came into force
in 2004; the second, fully revised version has been effec-
tive since January 2015 (WADA, 2014).
The core, standardized component of this regime
is essentially private in nature. Supplementing it is a
fragmented, unsystematized public component consist-
ing of: a variety of national anti-doping laws; two in-
tergovernmental conventions (the Anti-Doping Conven-
tion of the Council of Europe andUNESCO’s International
Convention against Doping in Sport); and one interna-
tional declaration (the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-
Doping in Sport). In its Anti-Doping Convention, dating
from as far back as 1989, the Council of Europe declared
that ‘public authorities and the voluntary sports organi-
sations have complementary responsibilities to combat
doping in sport’ (Council of Europe, 1989). The docu-
ment thus acts as a ‘big stick’ in the background, en-
suring public ‘shadowing’ of sporting self-regulation and,
at least indirectly, threatening the imposition of reg-
ulatory measures by the state where private arrange-
ments fail (Art. 10, Anti-Doping Convention of the Coun-
cil of Europe).
TheWADCwas first recognized by the world of states
in the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport,
which was adopted in 2003 and was subsequently rati-
fied by virtually every state in the world. By means of
this declaration, the ratifying states affirmed their com-
mitment to the provisions of the WADC. Sporting organi-
zations that ‘are not in compliance with the Code or ap-
plicable anti-doping rules adopted pursuant to the Code’
(World Conference on Doping in Sport, 2003) lose all or
part of their state funding. The second of the conven-
tions mentioned—UNESCO’s International Convention
against Doping in Sport—was adopted in 2005 (UNESCO,
2005). It is largely based on the version of WADC cur-
rent at that time, supplementing it with a further com-
mitment by the signatory states to institute suitable le-
gal or other anti-doping measures within their own ar-
eas of jurisdiction (Art. 9). With the state parties agree-
ing to incorporate private standards into international
agreements and national legislation, the public ‘shadow-
ing’ of transnational private regulationwas nowmatched
by a remarkable private ‘counter-shadowing’ of the state
(see Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008).7 Via the UNESCO Con-
vention and the Copenhagen Declaration, the signatory
governments undertake to support the provisions of
the privately instituted WADC and bring all other state-
instituted anti-doping measures into line with it.
The lex sportiva is a good candidate for investiga-
tion on several counts. Firstly, the transnational self-
regulation engaged in by sports organizations is charac-
terized by a particularly high degree of legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial authority. Within the autonomous
bodies of the sports world, state functions are fulfilled
by non-state actors who have the power to lay down
binding rules and to impose sanctions where these are
violated. Private regulation, bolstered by its anti-doping
code, is viewed as the international police-force of high-
level sports; but more than this—it gives the appearance
of sitting astride all (sporting) sectors and functioning as
a private law-maker and judge. In addition, it seeks to
achieve compliance primarily through sanctions and only
secondarily through ‘softer’ forms of governance. Given
this broad range of functions, the regulatory authority
exercised by private self-regulators in the sports world
is amenable to politicization. This means that, at least in
principle, this authority is open to contestation and jus-
tification by reference to the same norms that are rec-
ognized as playing a constitutive legitimating role in the
case of mandatory rule-making and rule-enforcement by
the state.
Secondly, selection of the lex sportiva for study is
based on its general character as a ‘regulatory hybrid’
(Siekmann, 2012, p. 314). Its overlapping public and pri-
vate governance arrangements constitute a particularly
impressive example of this hybridity. This make-up al-
lows direct, ‘in-case’ comparison of patterns of legitima-
tion for state and non-state regulation. Thus, the con-
troversy surrounding the German anti-doping legislation
that came into force in December 2015 enabled us to
view these patterns ‘in a nutshell’. Additional anecdotal
evidencewas drawn from the debates about the limits to
sport’s capacity for self-healing which were triggered, at
about the same time, by the exposure of state-sponsored
doping in Russia—and threw a different light on state in-
volvement in the fight against corruption in sport.
3.2. Data Sources
The underlying research for this study took the form
of a qualitative content analysis of written statements
made by political decision-makers and by representa-
tives of both athletes and sports associations. The data
was drawn from a variety of textual sources, the core
material being culled from records of debates held by
the lower chamber of the German parliament (the Bun-
destag) on 22 May and 13 November 2015 and the rest
from records of court and tribunal proceedings, quality
national and international newspapers, the sports me-
dia, and the websites of political parties and of rele-
6 The brief description given here draws on a more detailed account in Wolf (2014).
7 This shadowing and counter-shadowing emerges particularly clearly in Art. 22 of theWADC (‘Involvement of Governments’), which invites governments
to commit to the Code by acceding to relevant intergovernmental agreements.
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vant national and international sports associations.8 The
textual data was coded using basic keywords assigned
to the three patterns of legitimation outlined above:9
(1) freedom of association, autonomy of the societal
sphere, self-government, primacy of politics; (2) effec-
tiveness, achievement of regulatory objectives; (3) proce-
dural requirements, protection of basic rights, account-
ability, rule of law, impartial judicial proceedings. This
coding was used to identify patterns of legitimation em-
ployed, respectively, for the state and non-state compo-
nents of the hybrid national-cum-transnational/private-
cum-public anti-doping regime. For the sake of user-
friendliness, only sample quotations are included within
the text; others making essentially the same point ap-
pear in the footnotes.
4. Comparison of Patterns of Legitimation
The empirical plausibility probe that follows here aims
to establish whether the three patterns of legitimation
previously outlined are actually used to evaluate the le-
gitimacy of authority and, if so, to what extent. Do the
normative criteria by which the state-based components
of the sporting world’s hybrid regulatory regime differ
from those that are invoked in regard to its private el-
ements? More specifically, is it the case that when pri-
vate authority is being evaluated, justificatory grounds
relating to fundamental individual rights and the need
for democratic procedure take a back seat?
4.1. Arguments Relating to Freedom of Association and
Autonomy
4.1.1. Freedom of Association
Consistent with the first pattern of legitimation, the
large number of statements in favour of self-regulation
and against state intervention—from participants in the
parliamentary debates, from representatives of sports
associations, and in the national and international
media—were primarily outward-looking in their refer-
ences to associational freedom and self-determination.
Their chief concern was not performance or the degree
to which decision-making processes guaranteed internal
self-determination. The underlying premise in all of them
was that ‘only the Olympic family itself had the right
to decide which governance was good and which was
bad’ (Andersen, 2015). On this view, what legitimates
the sporting world’s autonomy is freedom of association,
which imposes clear limits on state intervention. Thomas
Bach, president of the International Olympic Committee
(IOC) and a member of the executive board of the Ger-
man Olympic Sports Confederation (Deutscher Olympis-
cher Sportbund, DOSB), argued that it was incumbent
on politicians to respect this autonomy (Financial Times,
2014). The same sentiment was expressed by the IOC’s
chief ethics and compliance officer, Girard Zapelli: ‘Gov-
ernments must respect the right of the citizens to work
together in associations no matter if the citizens are
sports people, coin collectors, environmentalists, rabbit
breeders or high school students’ (Andersen, 2015). The
Olympic Charter was quoted in support of the notion
that autonomy is a fundamental principle of sport: ‘Rec-
ognizing that sport occurs within the framework of soci-
ety, sports organizations within the Olympic Movement
shall have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which
include freely establishing and controlling the rules of
sport, determining the structure and governance of their
organizations, enjoying the right of elections free from
any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring
that principles of good governance be applied’ (WADA,
2015, p. 71).
State involvement was deemed appropriate only
where there was corrupt external interference. Whereas
game-manipulation was considered to fall under this
head, doping was viewed as an ‘internal attack’ on the
system which, as such, should be dealt with by sport’s
own sanctions-system (Becker, 2015a). Those drafting
criminal law should, it was felt, confine themselves to
protecting the basic values of social life. Fairness and in-
tegrity in sport did not count as such and were there-
fore not issues for criminal law. This manifest and well-
founded division must not be meddled with by anti-
doping legislation (Adolphsen & Kauerhof, 2013).
4.1.2. Autonomy
Sporting autonomy also featured prominently in the op-
posing arguments—in favour of state-based anti-doping
legislation—but the main focus here was on its limits. Al-
though sport, like all other sectors of society, should con-
tinue to have its private autonomy and other relevant
fundamental rights protected by the state, this did not
mean, so it was argued, that sport could operate outside
the legal order (Krings, 2015). The advent of commercial-
ization, corruption, and organized crime on the sporting
scene, it was felt, had put paid to the notion that any de-
fence of freedomof association in sport was a defence of
the freedom of all members of society. The reason the
German legislator deemed action impinging on the au-
tonomy of sports federations to be necessary was pre-
cisely because it promised to preserve the integrity of
this part of the societal sphere, not damage it. In January
2016, co-founder and former president ofWADA Richard
8 Specifically: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the International Sports Tribunal (CAS), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Guardian, Legal Tribune,
Los Angeles Times, The National, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Das Parlament, Der Spiegel, Sports Inquirer, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Tagesspiegel, The Tele-
graph, Die Welt, Deutschlandfunk, Deutschlandradio, Eurosport, Norddeutscher Rundfunk, German Olympic Sports Confederation, leichtathletik.de,
playthegame.org, Spox.com and World Anti-Doping Agency.
9 In order to allow for comparison with the findings of the other contributions to this issue, we also took account of the common framework suggested by
the editors inmaking our selection (see Coni-Zimmer,Wolf, & Collin, 2017). In addition to these pre-selected categories, inductive category-development
took place during the research process, with additional, more specific terms being included.
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W. Pound called the autonomy of sport ‘an outdated relic
from an earlier era’ which had degenerated into ‘a shield
behind which too many sports organisations at the inter-
national and national level have become greenhouses for
corruption and crime….This notion of autonomy is not
invented so corrupt people can hide behind it’ (Ander-
sen, 2015).
As the German minister of the interior Lothar de
Maizière put it: ‘What we are talking about here is
criminal law and federal legislation. Political consider-
ations take priority here, not the autonomy of sport’
(Hungermann, 2015). DOSB honorary presidentManfred
von Richthofen endorsed this view, insisting that: ‘If the
sporting world asks the state for help in an area where
crime is involved, this does not undermine the indepen-
dence of sport’ (Adolphsen & Kauerhof, 2013). With re-
gard to commercialization, it was argued that the prin-
ciple of autonomy ‘allows for all sport to govern itself as
long as it is association based.When sport becomes busi-
ness, it must abstain from the privileges enjoyed as an
association’ (Andersen 2015).10
4.2. Output-Related Patterns of Legitimation: Effective
Achievement of Regulatory Objectives
Those advancing performance-related arguments in sup-
port of sport’s right to regulate itself asserted that ‘there
was one thing sport could do better than the state and
that was to mete out immediate, hard-hitting penalties
on the [offending] athlete’ (Vesper, 2014). Sports tri-
bunals, it was pointed out, could suspend an athlete
just on suspicion of an offence; normal courts could not
(Kauerhof, 2007, p. 73).11 Furthermore, athletes who
tested positive for illicit substances could be given a
ban of up to four years by a sports tribunal, which was
much more of a deterrent than the sorts of penalties
that could be expected at the end of cumbersome legal
proceedings in a criminal court (Spox.com, 2015). With
these factors in mind, representatives of sports associ-
ations repeatedly argued that the introduction of crimi-
nal legislation would weaken sport’s own regulatory au-
thority: ‘The system of sanctions provided for in sporting
law would suffer a loss of legitimacy if the penalties im-
posed by sport differed completely from those imposed
by the state’ (Vesper, 2014; see also Hungermann, 2015).
Echoing these concerns, a sceptical German Bar Asso-
ciation warned against succumbing to the illusion that
the detection-rates for doping would be any better un-
der the state and described the newGerman anti-doping
legislation as no more than symbolic politics (Bouhs &
Kempe, 2015).
At the same time, performance-oriented observers
whowere critical of self-regulationmaintained that sanc-
tions could not be effective without input from the
state. Thus, supporters of national anti-doping legisla-
tion, whilst not denying the ability of sports tribunals
to deliver swift, appropriate, sports-specific, consistent
(and therefore equitable) rulings, pointed out that such
tribunals lacked the evidential reach of the courts. They
highlighted sport’s lack of appropriate investigative tools
and argued that criminal legislation was needed not only
for general preventative purposes but also to deal with
repression (Krings, 2015). ‘The punitive options open
to sport should’, they urged, ‘be complemented by the
more far-reaching tools available to the investigative au-
thorities of the state….This is a question of ‘effective par-
allel engagement, not of one side competing with the
other’ (Freitag, 2015). The legal powers and detection fa-
cilities of the state were needed in order, for example,
to be able to summon witnesses, conduct searches, tap
phones, and confiscate drugs (Haas, 2004). Again, only
the state, it was argued, could ensure that thosewho had
cheated were actually brought to book (Norddeutscher
Rundfunk, 2015). An overall conclusion drawn from all
this was that both institutions were needed—‘sporting
regulation and, as a last resort, for the really difficult
cases, criminal justice’ (Krings, 2015).12
The way in which the WADC focused on individual
athletes as the addressees of regulation was identified
as part of the reason why the Code had failed not only
to halt the growth in the use of, and trade in, banned
substances but also to counteract the increasing involve-
ment of organized crime in this market. Again, whilst the
WADC provided for the imposition of sanctions on ath-
letes who breached its rules, it made no provision for
the compensation of disadvantaged co-competitors. Self-
regulation, it was conceded, could prevent and punish
‘dirty victories’ by imposing suspensions and voiding re-
sults for specific events where anti-doping rules were
breached. Effective sanctioning of ‘dirty money’, by con-
trast, was felt not to be possiblewithout the involvement
of the state—the only actor that could reach beyond the
immediate sporting sphere to protect or punish affected
outsiders (Kauerhof, 2007, p. 75). Coaches, agents, and
physiotherapists whose athletes had tested positive for
banned substances were beyondWADA’s punitory reach:
only national anti-doping laws had the power—asWADA
president John Fahey put it—‘to catch the cheats behind
the cheats’ (Majendie, 2013).13
Athletes—the people directly affected by the actions
of cheating fellow competitors—joined with sports offi-
cials in accusing sports federations of not taking the fight
against doping seriously enough and called upon them
to play a more active role in this area (Reinsch, 2015).
Addressing allegations of systematic doping in Russian
athletics, an independent commission chaired by former
10 In a similar vein, Michael Hershman, a former member of FIFA’s Independent Governance Committee (IGC) argued that ‘sport needs to be regulated
and treated for what it is: big business’ and that ‘every single governing body in the sports world…needs to agree to modern standards of transparency
and accountability’ (Toman-Miller, 2015).
11 This naturally raises worries about rule-of-law deficits being a downside of greater effectiveness.
12 See also Engelmeier (2015).
13 See also Haas (2004).
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WADA president Richard Pound expressed similar criti-
cism, accusing WADA of ‘having been too soft on en-
forcing compliance with its code’ (Rumsby, 2015; WADA,
2015). The state, it was argued, must step in to control
negative externalities whose effects reached far beyond
the sporting domain—into areas such as public health
and the economic interests of those disadvantaged by
others’ use of banned substances. Even current WADA
director-general David Howman conceded that the regu-
latory problem was ‘getting too big for sport to manage’
and made explicit reference to global organized crime.14
‘Unless we make something mandatory’, he observed,
people won’t do it’ (Gibson, 2013).
Although state involvement was considered a neces-
sary condition for the improved achievement of sport’s
own regulatory objectives, the fact that the state could
also be part of the problem did not pass unnoticed: the
independent WADA report on doping in Russian athlet-
ics stated that ‘it would be naïve in the extreme to con-
clude that activities on the scale discovered could have
occurred without the explicit or tact approval of Russian
governmental authorities’ (WADA, 2015, p. 48).
4.3. Input-Related Patterns of Legitimation
4.3.1. Protection of Individual Rights
One of the major demands in relation to public regula-
tion was that it should monitor private norm-setting and
norm-enforcement for possible abuse. The same norma-
tive criteria, relating to fundamental rights and procedu-
ral requirements, were used to judge the structures and
rulings of sporting bodies and the state-based elements
of the lex sportiva. Apart from the invocation of the right
to associational freedom and self-government, which
was aimed at defending sporting autonomy (see 4.1.),
most arguments based on the protection of fundamental
rights and procedural requirements targeted weaknesses
in private self-regulation and sought to bolster the case
for public legislation. There was one interesting excep-
tion, however: theDOSB argued that, as part of the funda-
mental right to self-determination, even the right to self-
destructiveness must be preserved. If the state restricted
this ‘right to self-harm’ by imposing, as it were, a duty
to follow a healthy life-style, then this could not be con-
fined to sporting activities: it must also apply, for exam-
ple, to alcohol and tobacco consumption (Becker, 2015b).
On these grounds, it was said, national anti-doping leg-
islation constituted exceptional criminal legislation that
could not be justified (Künast, 2015). Those in favour of
the legal prohibition of dopingwere challenged to explain
‘why top-level athletes should not have the same right as
all other people involved in sport, or all other people in
general, to put their health at risk’ (Mutlu, 2015).
The view of organized athletes, however, was that au-
tonomyhadprimarily been used as a shield behindwhich
to ‘remove the fundamental rights of athletes as profes-
sional working people’ (Schwab, 2015). In evidence, they
cited the fact that, prior to any Olympic Games, the IOC,
the various national sports associations, and all the in-
dividual athletes are required to give undertakings that,
should relevant circumstances arise, they will not use
any means of legal redress other than those provided
‘in-house’. Sport’s private arbitration system thus com-
pels athletes to sign agreements with their respective na-
tional sporting associations waiving their basic civil right
to seek redress from national courts. Fundamental rights
and their violation also attracted public attention when
the European Court of Justice dealt with a number of
individual lawsuits against sporting associations. Thus,
in what has come to be known as the Bosman Ruling—
under which football players in the European Union may
now change clubs at the end of their contract without
a transfer-fee being paid—the court concluded that ‘the
abolition as betweenMember States of obstacles to free-
dom of movement for persons would be compromised if
the abolition of State barriers could be neutralized by ob-
stacles resulting from the exercise of their legal auton-
omy by associations or organizations not governed by
public law’ (ECJ, 1995).
Because of the monopoly status of sports associa-
tions, the allegedly voluntary nature of individual con-
sent to a sporting association’s rules is not regarded as a
real counter to the imbalance between, on the one hand,
the opportunities open to the regulatory subjects to in-
fluence the rules that apply to them and, on the other,
the grave consequences of decisions made on the ba-
sis of those rules, or even simply of a refusal to submit
oneself to the relevant regulatory regime. Against this
background, lawyers have described the lex sportiva as a
form of ‘authoritarian rule by monopolistic associations’
(Reuter, 1996, as cited by Röthel, 2007, p. 758).
4.3.2. Rule of Law and Equal Treatment Before Courts
The assurance of equal treatment before sports tribunals
was repeatedly cited as proof of the legitimacy of sport’s
own procedures. Pointing to current ‘harmonisation for
all sports and all countries’ and the ‘huge achievement’
this represented, WADA director-general David Howman
warned against a shift to national anti-doping legisla-
tion. Such a move, he said, ‘would result in athletes
in different sports or from different countries receiving
different bans for the same offences, and even worse
athletes from the same sport receiving different penal-
ties depending on the country they competed for’ (Tele-
graph, 2012).
Given this gloomy prospect of piecemeal national so-
lutions, duplicate competencies, and varying legal stan-
dards, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) was seen
as the only mechanism offering international scope and
consistency in the resolution of anti-doping disputes. The
CAS itself pointed out that with involvement by national
courts, ‘the risk of contradictory decisions would [be]
14 Speaking of the UK, Howman stated: ‘If you think the mafia and underworld aren’t involved in this country in sport, you’re in fairyland’ (Gibson, 2013).
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higher with athletes being able to compete in certain
countries but not in others’ (CAS, 2015).15 The DOSB’s
Athletes’ Commission argued along the same lines: ‘Hav-
ing standard judicial procedures for sport is the only
way to ensure that all sportswomen and sportsmen,
and all infringements of the rules, are treated equally’
(DOSB, 2015).When it came to othermatters, however—
namely, rule of law, impartiality, independence, and
transparency—grave doubts were raised about the CAS.
These issues loomed large, for example, in the case
brought by German skater Claudia Pechstein against the
International Skating Union. The Higher Regional Court
in Munich, to which the skater had appealed, concluded
that sports associations were abusing their ‘market dom-
inance’ because they had major influence in determin-
ing who was appointed to the CAS’s board of arbitrators
(Becker, 2015b). National legislation was advocated as
a necessary means of controlling the private abuse of
regulatory authority—which, in the case just described,
meant ensuring that the rule of law prevailed in regard
to the neutrality of sports tribunals. An increased focus
on the principle of the presumption of innocence was
also broadly supported. Athletes’ protection should be
enhanced by making it a requirement that prosecutors
prove possession of performance-enhancing substances
for doping purposes (de Maizière, 2015).16
4.3.3. Accountability Mechanisms
Arguments relating to inadequate democratic procedure
were voiced mainly in regard to the private elements
of the lex sportiva. The poor extent to which the reg-
ulatory authority exercised by sports organizations was
subject to oversight and control was regarded as dent-
ing the legitimacy of sporting self-regulation. It was
pointed out that most of the 35 international Olympic
sports federations lacked an institutional design that
would ‘[allow] their constituents to monitor and sanc-
tion decision-making body members’ (Geeraert, 2015,
pp. 9–10). Transparency International, in its 2016 Global
Corruption Report, described the corporate structures of
sport as archaic and claimed that sports organizations
had actually ‘chosen not to adapt in order to protect cer-
tain self-interests, including high salaries, bonuses and
virtually limitless tenures’ (Transparency International,
2016, p. xix).17 From the perspective of athletes, ‘sports
are structured as cartels, they warrant not special treat-
ment and protection but enhanced scrutiny and account-
ability’ (Schwab, 2015).
Again, in the wake of the previously mentioned
Pound report on Russian doping, the head of Australian
athletics is reported to have pointed to the absence of a
robust, overarching IAAF governance structure and clear
lines of accountability at the International Association
of Athletics Federations (IAFF), claiming that this had
‘enabled practices that have compromised the integrity
of the whole sport of athletics’ (Sports Inquirer, 2016).
Pound himself talked of ‘a complete breakdown of gover-
nance structures and lack of accountability’ at the IAAF
and claimed the organization was guilty of ‘an evident
lack of political appetite…to confront Russia with the full
extent of its known and suspected doping activities’ (The
National, 2016). It had, said Pound, failed to tackle the
nepotism that had made possible one of the most cor-
rupt regimes ever seen in sport (Rumsby, 2016). Crimi-
nologist Dieter Roessner suggests the prosecution of spe-
cific cases of doping by sports authorities is essentially a
tactic to distract attention from a systemic problem by
individualizing it (Bouhs & Kempe, 2015).
5. Conclusion
Amidst reports that democratic sources of political legit-
imacy are undergoing a decline, this study tackles the is-
sue by asking whether the emergence of private forms of
regulation in the transnational sphere has brought with
it a shift in the normative standards used to judge reg-
ulatory authority or whether the legitimation of private
self-regulation and state-based regulation are grounded
in similar values. Three ideal-type patterns of legitima-
tion were tested for plausibility on the basis of a con-
tent analysis of actual controversies about the legiti-
macy of regulatory authority in the sporting domain—
specifically, the hybrid governance-regime relating to the
use of performance-enhancing substances in sports.
Comparison of patterns of legitimation for the pub-
lic and private elements of the regime revealed that
there was no systematic difference between the values
on which the two kinds of elements were judged. Ar-
guments drawing on democratic sources of political le-
gitimacy were remarkably present in the debates about
self-regulation in sport and were, in fact, utilized by both
sides to justify their positions. The plausibility test did
not support the notion that the spread of private self-
regulation has resulted in a decline in the importance of
input-related factors in legitimation. These include, for
example, accountability, impartiality in regulatory pro-
ceedings, and the protection of fundamental rights such
as the democratic right to self-determination and to the
oversight and control of power.
Generalizations on the basis of a single-country,
single-sector plausibility-test—albeit supplemented by
anecdotal evidence fromother sources—must, of course,
be approached with care. A collation of insights from var-
ious case-studies could form the basis of a more system-
atic comparative investigation. These studies should in-
clude reviews of regulatory regimes that are not such
ready candidates for politicization: one reason for the
15 See also de Maizière (2015).
16 TheWADA report on systematic doping in Russia, released on 9November 2015, also addressed ‘major concerns about RUSADA’s [Russian Anti-Doping
Agency] functioning as an impartial institution’ (WADA, 2015, p. 16). See also Bouhs and Kempe (2015).
17 See also Alvad (2016).
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wide range of patterns of legitimation proffered in the
debates about the hybrid regime’s private core may lie
in the comprehensiveness of the political authority the
regime has acquired and the legitimatory requirements
that follow from this. Important additional insights could
also be gained by taking possible cross-sector differences
into account.Whether regulatory authority is wielded by
a business corporation or by civil society, for example, is
likely to be of some significance.
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